Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) , most ofthe literature on capital structure has assumed that debt is chosen to maximize shareholders' value. Recent papers, however, have explored the implications of giving control over the capital-structure decision to self-interested managers. Zwiebel (1996) , for instance, argues that, in the absence of a takeover threat, managers underlever to avoid being ousted in default. In contrast, managers of target firms lever up to commit to anincrease in value that makes a disciplinary takeover unnecessary. In support of the managerial approach to the capital-structure problem, Garvey and Hanka (1999) document that firms respond to an increase (decrease) in takeover costs by decreasing (increasing) leverage, while Safieddine and Titman (1999) report an increase in operating performance for firms that lever up the most in response to an unsuccessful takeover attempt.
Yet, committing to increase the firm's value may not save a target manager's job. Despite finding an increase in performance, Safieddine and Titman document that 32% of the 573 firms in their sample replaced their managers within a year of the failed takeover attempt. Since previous studies focusing on broader samples report a much lower turnover rate, l managers under a takeover threat apparently need to convince their shareholders that not only will they enhance value but also that they are the best persons for the job. The increase in leverage that commits the managers to increase value also signals their skills.
The existence of opposing effects makes the updating about the manager's skills non trivial.
As in the signaling models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) , high leverage conveys good news if it reflects the management 's ability to generate cash flows. It conveys bad news, however, if inefficient managers, who are likely to fear takeovers the most, are more pressured to lever up. This paper demonstrates that if takeover costs are large, high leverage conveys good news about a target manager, as in the classic signaling papers on capital structure choice. With small takeover costs, negative updating prevails. Thus, managers who lever up to end a takeover threat may commit to increase the firm's value and yet increase their chances of being fired by their shareholders.
In the model, a firm is run by a self-interested manager who, in the absence of a takeover threat, would not undertake a reorganization of assets that increases the firm's value but lDenis and Denis (1995) , for instance, report a 17% managerial turnover rate for a sample of 1,689 firms in the Value Line Survey. 1 decreases her own utility. Examples of asset reorganizations are divestitures of assets (as in Stulz, 1990) or the end of an inefficient investment program (as in Grossman and Hart, 1982 , Jensen, 1986 , and Hart and Moore, 1995 .
Under a takeover threat, if the manager does not reorganize assets, the raider will take over the firm to maximize its value. Nonetheless, committing to reorganize the firm is not that simple, because the raider may anticipate that the reorganization plan will be aborted once the takeover threat ends. As in Grossman and Hart (1982) , Jensen (1986) , and more recently Zwiebel (1996) , the manager will have to use the firm's capital structure as a commitment device. More precisely, I follow Zwiebel (1996) and assume that, in financial distress, managers lose bargaining power vis-à-vis the shareholders, who -possibly with the help of a bankruptcy court -can then costlessly coordinate their actions to replace the incumbent management whenever they see fito (A lower cost of removing managers in financiaI distress is consistent with Gilson (1989) , who finds that 52% of his sample of financially distressed firms experience turnover in any given year.) Risky debt, therefore, implies a distress threat that makes the value-enhancing reorganization plan in the incumbent manager's best interest whether a raider is present or noto Unlike in the existing capital-structure literature, the commitment by incumbent management to reorganize assets may not be enough to block a takeover. In this paper, the target manager must also convince the raider that she is the best person for the job. Accordingly, consider that the incumbent manager is one of two types: high or low. If the manager does not redeploy assets, high-and low-type managers are equally efficient. But for a reorganized firm, low-type managers are less efficient. 2 In a takeover market, raiders specialize in gathering information that can help them assess the profitability of a takeover. One example of this type of information is the incumbent manager's ability to reorganize the assets. Gathering information is costly, though. As such, in equilibrium, the raider is likely to obtain only a noisy signal of the manager's quality.
Acting on his noisy signal, the raider may mistakenly take over the firm, replacing a high-type manager who is committed to the reorganization plano Hence the raider's noisy signal poses a 2For instance, both types of manager may be equally efficient in running a company that has not been operating at full capacity. If some of the firm's assets are sold, the manager's ability to optimize the production line may then become crucial to the firm's profitability . 2 threat to the high-type manager, who, therefore, has two reasons to lever up: committing to the reorganization plan and signaling to the raider her superior skills.
High leverage will end the takeover threat while sending a positive signal about the manager's quality if the raider believes the incumbent would not have levered up that much had she not felt confident about her ability to reorganize the firmo li high leverage ends the takeover threat, though, a low-type manager may be willing to lever up to a point at which repayment becomes far from certain. As a result, high leverage does not necessarily convey a positive signal about the skills of a target manager. The increase in leverage may refiect a greater willingness by low-type managers to substitute financiai distress for a takeover threat. This paper demonstrates that high leverage implies a negative (positive) signal about the manager's skills if takeover costs are small (large). The intuition is as follows. Suppose that some debt D H commits the firm to the reorganization plan while revealing the incumbent manager as a high type. The low-type manager will feel compelled to choose this debt as well.
After all, neither the shareholders nor the raider will want to replace the incumbent if they are convinced that she is a high type. Yet, D H will not insulate the low type from the risk of managerial turnover in financiai distress if the debt is safe for the high-type manager. In this case, financiai distress lets shareholders know that the incumbent is a low-type manager who has mimicked the high type, making it optimal to trigger managerial turnover. Hence it is costly for a low type to mimic a high-type manager who tries to signal her skills with a debt levei D H that is risky for the low-type manager only. The question, then, is whether the low-type manager has a better way to avoid the takeover.
As it turns out, the low-type manager can deter the raider without mimicking the high type.
Since takeovers and financiai distress are altemative mechanisms to remove bad managers, a distress threat reduces the value added by a takeover. A low-type can thus make the takeover unprofitable to the raider by choosing a debt levei that commits the firm to the reorganization plan while implying a probability of financiai distress that preempts enough of the only remaining gain of a takeover, namely, managerial turnover. Moreover, if takeover costs are large, a relatively low probability of financiai distress should block the takeover.
Hence the low-type manager should be able to deter the raider with a debt level-call it D NT -that is risky for her but smaller than the high-type manager's debt DH. The low type has 3 then no reason to mimic the high type; the smaller debt DNT allows her to deter the raider with a lower probability of being ousted in financial distress. As such, the higher debt DH reveals the incumbent as a high type, making the raider's noisy signal about the manager's quality irrelevant to the takeover decision. A separating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys good news about the manager thus exists when takeover costs are large.
In contrast, small takeover costs imply that D NT will be risky for both types of manager.
As a result, the high-type manager may lead the firm into financial distress under any DH larger than DNT, making it impossible for the shareholders to selectively punish a low type who mÍmÍcs the high-type manager. Thus, if takeover costs are small, high leverage cannot signal the superior skills of a high-type manager.
li high leverage cannot convey good news about the incumbent manager, a separating equilibrium in which the larger debt signals an inferior manager arises as a natural solution to the capital structure problem. As it turns out, such a separating equilibrium does not existo
To obtain an equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news, I look at a semiseparating equilibrium. In particular, I focus on a semiseparating equilibrium in which on1y the low-type manager fears takeovers enough to accept the high risk of financial distress that is required to end the takeover threat. More precisely, the low-type manager is indifferent between a high debt level that deters the raider and the high type's lower debt that keeps alive the possibility that the raider will take over the firm in response to his noisy signal. When choosing the larger debt, the low-type manager reveals her type. Thus, she commits to enhance firm value and yet increases her chances of being replaced by her shareholders.
The comparative statics on the debt choices of the semiseparating equilibrium resemble some of the predictions of the managerialliterature on capital structure choice. For example, both the high and low debt levels decrease with the takeover costs. Somewhat surprisingly, though, the incentives for a low-type manager to pool with the high type at the lower debt level increase when the takeover costs decrease. Accordingly, the model predicts a relatively low dispersion of intraindustry leverage in periods of low takeover costs.
Perhaps more interestingly, the model provides testable implications for the interaction between the takeover costs and the signal debt conveys about the manager's skills. In periods of large takeover costs, high leverage commits the firm to enhance value in addition to conveying
.
a positive signal about the incumbent manager's skills. In contrast, small takeover costs imply that the commitment to enhance value is at least partially offset by the negative signal about the incumbent 's skills that high leverage conveys. Hence the model predicts that stock price reactions to debt-for-equity exchanges should be stronger when the market for corporate control is less threatening to managers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the framework.
Section 2 shows that high leverage conveys good news about the manager's ability only if takeover costs are not too small. Section 3 characterizes a semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage commits the incumbent manager to reorganize the firm's assets but sends a negative signal about her skills. Section 4 discusses the empirical implications and relates them to the existing evidence on capital structure choice. Conclusions follow. Proofs of the propositions that are not present in the text can be found in the appendix.
1 General Framework
Preferences and cash fiows
Consider an all-equity firm run by a self-interested manager. The conflicts of interest between the manager and the shareholders are twofold. First, the firm's value could be enhanced by an action that reduces the manager's utility. For concreteness, this action is identified as the implementation of a reorganization plan, which can be interpreted as a divestiture of assets or the end of an inefficient investment programo Second, the incumbent manager may not be the best person to reorganize the firmo li she isn't, shareholders cannot rely on her to step down voluntarily.
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As is standard in the signaling and managerialliterature on capital structure choice, managerial incentive contracts are ruled out. Hence, as in Moore (1995) and Zwiebel (1996) , the utility of the manager is B > O if she stays in control until the final cash fiows are realized and zero otherwise. 4 Moreover, although reorganizing the firm is costly for the 3The tension between a CEO who wants to keep her job and shareholders who want the best person to run the business is the same as in Grossman and Hart (1988) , Harris and Raviv (1988 ), Israel (1992 , and Stulz (1988) .
4In his seminal paper, Ross (1977) allows for an exogenous compensation scheme for the manager. Nonetheless, he does not jointly solve for the signaling equilibrium and the optimal incentive contract. More generally, manager, this cost is secondary to her cost of losing controI. Accordingly, I omit the manager's reorganization cost in the analysis, assuming instead that the manager will be willing to commit to the reorganization plan if its implementation reduces the probability of losing control by even a very small amount.
The analysis is restricted to two production periods. The cash-flow generation of the first period, e + SI, consists of two components. The first, e, is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] and captures the firm's uncertainty that is outside the manager's controI. The second component, SI, depends on the asset reorganization.
If the firm is not reorganized, SI = O and the first-period cash flow collapses to e. In turn, the value of reorganizing the firm depends on the manager's skills. It is assumed that, regardless of e, a high-type manager runs a reorganized firm more efficiently than a low type.
For instance, if the reorganization requires a leaner firm with a smaller market share, a hightype manager will be more creative in reducing costs than a low type. Accordingly, the reorganization of assets increases the first cash flow by S H > O under a high-type manager and by SL < SH under a low-type manager. I do not allow, however, the difference in efficiency to be too large. Formally, The second-period cash flow, kS2, is interpreted as the value of the firm's future operational cash flows (other than the first one), where k > 1. This second cash flow also depends on whether and how the firm is reorganized. If the firm is not reorganized, S2 = O and the firm's value is equal to the value of the current assets, which is ignored in the analysis to reduce notation. Alternatively, reorganizing the firm increases its continuation value to kS2 > O, where S2 E {SH, SL}. In principIe, the incumbent manager is allowed to postpone the firm's reorganization to a point that only the second cash flow would be increased. Nonetheless, incentive contracts may be used to avoid costly signaling devices. The signaling literature ignores this possibility, though. AIso, Persons (1994) demonstrates that renegotiation weakens the effectiveness of managerial contracts and Garvey (1997) shows that managers' ability to trade on secondary capital markets undermines managerial incentive schemes.
5 Assumption 1 rules out separating equilibria in which the high-type manager chooses a debt levei that, although safe for her, leads the low-type manager to financiai distress with probability 1. 6 the incumbent manager cannot change the firm's organization once she has reorganized the assets. Assuming a risk-neutral economy with a zero risk-free rate, the firm's value under the incumbent manager is equal to where Si E {O, SH, sd for i E {I, 2} and S2 = SI if SI =f O.
If the incumbent manager is fired, a new one -with average type s == ~SL + ~SH -is hired.
The hiring of the new manager will not affect the fust cash flow, which is determined by the realization of () and the original manager's type and reorganization decision. 6 Managerial turnover may affect the second-period cash flow, though. For instance, if a high-type manager who reorganized the fum at t = O is mistakenly replaced, the fum's continuation value drops from kSH to ks. In turn, the replacement of a low-type incumbent increases value from kSL to ks.
The takeover threat
The incumbent manager faces a raider who may profit from a disciplinary takeover that maximizes the value of the firmo As in Zwiebel (1996) , the manager is partially entrenched, that is, the takeover succeeds only if it increases the firm's value by more than a cutoff C > O, which is interpreted as a takeover cost.
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Although partially entrenched, the incumbent manager is not fully insulated from the takeover market. In particular, a takeover will happen with probability 1 if the manager cannot convince the raider that the company will be reorganized. Convincing the raider is not that easy, though. Since it is assumed that outsiders do not observe the firm's reorganization, the raider may think that once the takeover threat ends, the incumbent will abort the reorganization plano Still, it will be shown later that the incumbent manager can commit to the 6This assumption can be justified by the existence of a time lag for a new manager to adapt the firm's operations to her management style. 7Entrenchment may happen for several reasons. For one, free-riding problems may make it more difficult for a raider to profit from a takeover that aims to replace a suboptimal manager. (See Grossman and Hart, 1980 .) Free-riding problems can be partly solved if shareholders perceive themselves as pivotal to the outcome of the takeover (Holmstrom and Nalebuff, 1992) or if they allow the raider to dilute the firm's value. In either of these two cases, the takeover succeeds if the efficiency gains are sufficiently large. 7 reorganization plan by levering up. The raider's incentives to take over the firm do not necessarily end with the manager's commitment to reorganize the assets. By replacing a low-type manager who is committed to the reorganization plan, the raider increases the firm's continuation value from kSL to ks, where s == !SL + !SH is the average type of the new manager. Note, however, that the raider may mistakenly replace a high-type manager who has reorganized the firmo If so, the firm's value will decrease from kS H to ks. Therefore, the raider's takeover decision depends on his beliefs about the quality of the incumbent. Such beliefs depend on his initial priors, the updating after the capital structure choice, and the realization of a private signal, r E {ro, r1}.
I interpret the signal r as follows. In a takeover market, raiders specialize in gathering information that can help them assess the profitability of a takeover, for instance, a target manager's quality. Gathering information is costly, however. Thus, in equilibrium, raiders are likely to obtain only noisy signals of managers' qualities. Accordingly, I assume that 1'1 (1'0) will positively (negatively) update the raider's beliefs about the manager's type. More precisely, for equally likely priors about the two types, 1'1 updates the probability of the incumbent's being a low type to prob(s = sLh) == P1 E (O, ~). In turn, 1'= 1'0 negatively updates equally likely priors about the incumbent's type to prob(s = sLlro) == po E (~, 1), which, in spite ofthe manager's commitment to reorganize, I assume to be enough to trigger a takeover if the raider is the only remaining threat to the incumbent. For the takeover threat to end, leverage must commit the manager to reorganize the company and it must also overcome the realization of the negative signal 1'0. Formally,
Assumption 2 Suppose that the incumbent manager is committed to reorganize the firmo
Still, a takeover will occur if the raider believes that the probability that the incumbent manager is a low type is at least po > ! and the raider is the only remaining threat to the incumbent manager's job.
Assumption 2 elicits incentives for the high-type manager to signal her superior type. The capital structure choice under a takeover threat thus depends not only on the commitment role of debt but also on its signaling dimension. the debt leveI D and whether to reorganize the firmo In making these choices, the manager aims to maximize her chances of staying in control, which are threatened by the possibility of a takeover at time t = 1. Moreover, the manager takes into account that she is the only one to know her type and, while in control, the only one to observe whether the reorganization has taken place. The raider and the shareholders have equally likely priors about the manager's type (SH and SL), which may be updated once the capital structure decision is observed.
At time t = 1, the raider receives the private signal T E {TO, TIl of the quality of the incumbent manager and takes over the firm if the takeover gains outweigh the takeover cost C. For simplicity, I assume that, from the perspective of the raider, the two signals, TO and Tl, are equally likely when the manager chooses the capital structure (time t = O). Therefore, consistency with the priors (prob(s = SH) = prob(s = sd = ~) requires that Po + Pl = 1,
If a takeover does not happen at t = 1, the incumbent manager stays in place at least problem, the inference of the manager's type. In their study of greenmail payments, Giarnrnarino, Heinkel, and Hollifield (1997) also combine a signaling problem with a moral hazard problem.
90ne might argue that the manager should postpone the increase in leverage to time t = 1, when the raider actually receives the signal of the manager's quality. As Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) and Garvey and Hanka (1999) show, however, firms do not necessarily wait until a takeover bid is on the table to adopt defensive measures. In particular, managers are likely to increase leverage once the takeover threat increases. One possible reason for an ear1y increase in leverage is that it might be harder to fight a raider once a substantial fraction of the takeover costs has been sunk. A preemptive increase in leverage thus enhances the chances of avoiding a takeover. To focus on the signaling and commitment dimensions of leverage, I have ignored in the analysis the benefits and costs of preempting a takeover bid. Instead, I assume that the manager levers up at t = O, when the strength of the takeover threat is still uncertain. 9 until t = 2, when the first cash flow, () + Sl, is realized. AIso at t = 2, any debt is due. If the firm is unable to pay the debt, an event I call financiaI distress, shareholders will update their beliefs about the quality of the incumbent. As the next subsection shows, a threat of managerial turnover then follows. Finally, at time t = 3 the second cash flow occurs and the firm is liquidated.
The financial distress threat
If the firm is unable to pay its debt, the manager either sells some of the firm's assets to pay the creditors or renegotiates the debt. In any case, her bargaining position with the shareholders is weakened. As in Zwiebel (1996) , I model this loss of bargaining power by assurning that, in financiaI distress, shareholders can replace the incumbent whenever they see fit (i.e. C = 0).10 Note, however, that financial distress does not necessarily imply that shareholders are better off replacing the incumbent management. Since financial distress shifts control to the shareholders, they can force both the incumbent and the new manager to reorganize. The dismissal of the incumbent, therefore, boils down to whether, in expectation, a superior manager will be hired.
In the tradition of the costly verification mo deIs (e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1985) , shareholders cannot costlessly verify the first-period cash flow without firing the incumbent. Thus if a manager who is committed to the reorganization plan announces that the firm is unable to repay a debt leveI D (i.e. the firm is financially distressed), shareholders update their beliefs about the quality of the incumbent to prob(s = sLls + () < D) and replace her if the expected gains from managerial turnover are positive under the updated beliefs, that is,
FinanciaI distress is not a costless disentrenchment device, though. An extensive literature in corporate finance has identified efficiency costs in financiaI distress. 12 Assume then that 10 Ali the results are qualitatively unchanged if I assume that financiai distress reduces the shareholders' cost of removing the incumbent manager, without necessarily assuring that shareholders can trigger managerial turnover.
llSee Fluck (1998) for a paper that focuses on the shareholders' decision to replace the incumbent management. In Harris and Raviv (1990) , shareholders also use financiai distress as a signal of whether to replace the incumbent manager. In their paper, however, debt maximizes the firm's value.
l2See Myers (1977) and Titman (1984) for two papers that identify inefficiencies in financiai distress and Opler and Titman (1994) for some empirical support of the relevance of the financiai distress costs. financiaI distress costs a fraction ,\ E (0,1) of the firm's cash-flow. In this case, the firm's inability to pay the debt D in full imposes a loss of '\(SI + B) where SI depends on whether the firm has been reorganized and on the original manager's quality (i.e. SI E {O, SL, SH}). In principIe, the financiaI distress costs could also affect the firm's continuation value. I assume, however, that, after the firm becomes financially distressed, shareholdersjmanagement succeed to restructure the firm, avoiding permanent losses to the firm's ability to generate cash flows.
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In this setting, shareholders benefit from firing a suboptimal manager regardless of the costs of financial distress. Hence, financiaI distress costs are not important to the turnover decision. More surprisingly, financiaI distress costs do not afIect the takeover gains, which ultimately determine the manager's capital structure decision. Since a new manager will not afIect the first-period cash-flow, a takeover cannot save financiaI distress costs, which are then irrelevant to the raider's takeover decision. Accordingly, we can ignore the financial distress costs in the analysis. 
Leverage Conveys Good N ews about Managers' Quality
In the classic signaling equilibrium of Ross (1977) , the risk of financiaI distress prevents less profitable firms from mimicking the more profitable ones at a higher leverage. This section demonstrates that financiaI distress plays a similar role if takeover costs are large. High leverage, therefore, may commit the firm to a value-enhancing reorganization plan while conveying good news about the incumbent manager's quality.
The entrenchment role of debt
If high leverage conveys good news about the incumbent manager, low leverage conveys bad news. In this paper, ending a takeover threat is the sole reason for a manager to increase leverage. Accordingly, one might wonder why a manager would choose a low leverage leveI 13Yet, the mo dei allows the financiai distress cost to be larger than the takeover cost C. 14Financial distress costs will be relevant to the analysis if the raider can increase cash fiows in time to avoid financiai distress. In this case, saving the financiai distress costs increases the takeover gains, making it more difficult for a manager to use debt to deter the raider. This additional takeover gain can be modeled as a reduction of takeover costs, which, as section 3 shows, also makes it more difficult for debt to block a takeover. Hence, takeover costs that decrease with the manager's debt choice can substitute for the constraints that the financiai distress costs may impose on the use of debt as an entrenchment device. AB such, the qualitative results of the paper do not rely on whether a raider can avoid financiai distress costs.
that conveys a signal about her skills that in principIe should enhance the incentives for a takeover. I now show that debt can deter the raider despite revealing the incumbent as a low-type manager.
Suppose that a low-type manager reveals her type through the choice of some debt leveI DL > O. Two implications follow. First, shareholders will replace the incumbent as soon as financiaI distress shifts control to them. Minimizing the risk of managerial turnover in financiaI distress then leads to the second implication: DL commits the low-type manager to reorganize the fum. The value added by a takeover is thus determined by the gains of replacing a low-type manager, which do not depend on the raider's noisy signal r. (If debt reveals the incumbent's type, the raider's signal about the manager's quality is irrelevant to the takeover decision. 15 ) The increase in value that follows the raider's decision to replace the incumbent manager should not be entirely credited to the takeover. Since DL implies that the shareholders will replace the incumbent in financiaI distress, the raider's value added is equal to the managerial turnover gains in the nondistress states only.
More formally, let DL = sL + a be the low-type manager's debt choice. Since DL commits the incumbent to reorganize the firm, financial distress will happen if and only if DL > S L + B =} B < a. For B uniform in the interval [O, 1] , financiaI distress will happen with probability a.
Therefore, the value added by a takeover is (1-a )k( s -S L), where 1-a is the probability that DL does not lead the low-type manager into financiaI distress and k(s -sL) is the expected gain of hiring a new manager with average type s = sLt sH to replace the low-type incumbent.
Clearly, a sufficiently large probability of financial distress, a, will reduce the value added by a takeover enough to make it unprofitable. In particular, for a given takeover cost C, the
NT , that ends the takeover threat despite revealing the incumbent as a low-type manager solves
Intuitively, although the debt leveI DNT reveals to the raider that there are gains m replacing the incumbent manager, it does not pay to take over the company because the fum's 15The raider's signal will be important in the analysis of mixed strategy and semiseparating equilibria, though. See Proposition 2 in section 2.2.
Ieverage is likeIy to shift control to the shareholders, who will then fire the incumbent. High Ieverage, thus, may end a takeover threat despi te sending a bad signal about the manager's quality.16
It then follows that the low-type manager does not need to mimic the high type to survive the takeover threat. She can choose instead the minimum debt leveI D NT that ends the takeover threat regardless of the raider's beliefs. Still, while the debt D NT implies managerial turnover in financiaI distress, the low-type manager may think that, by mimicking the hightype manager's debt strategy, she can insulate herself from both the takeover and the distress threat. Afier all, shareholders have no reason to trigger managerial turnover in financiaI distress if they are convinced that the incumbent is a high-type manager. Yet largue beIow that mimicking the high-type manager will not insulate a low type from the risk of managerial turnover in financiaI distress if takeover costs are large.
Takeover costs and the signaling role of financiaI distress
In the signaling Iiterature on capital structure choice, high leverage reveals the firm's superior value because the manager of an inferior firm would not be willing to chance financiaI distress to temporarily mislead the market. In the context of this paper, retaining control is the manager's first and only priority. Accordingly, financiaI distress imposes a cost on a low-type manager who mimics the high-type manager's strategy only if it triggers managerial turnover. As I now show, this condition implies that high leverage conveys good news about the manager's quality only if takeover costs are Iarge.
From equation (1), the smallest debt that can deter a raider who knows that the incumbent manager is a low type is V Given the manager's choice of D H , shareholders can be certain that the firm will repay 16Israel (1991) argues that the presence of risky debt in the target's capital structure shifts some of the takeover gains to the debt holders. For a high enough debt levei, this transfer of gains will make the takeover unprofitable to the raider. The results of the paper thus do not rely on the mechanism that I use (i.e., the replacement of the incumbent manager in financiai distress) to obtain an entrenchment role for debt.
17 Formally, D
the debt if the incumbent manager is a high type. A distress event, therefore, would let the shareholders know the incumbent is a low-type manager who has mimicked the high type. 18
Acting on their updated beliefs, the shareholders will fire the incumbent manager in financiaI distress. Anticipating managerial turnover in financiaI distress, the low-type manager will be strictly better off with the debt D NT that deters the raider with a lower probability of financiaI 3. Beiiefs: prob(s 
Assume now that takeover costs are small. Thus the minimum debt D NT that ends the takeover threat is likely to be risky for both types of manager. 20 Still, suppose that the high-type manager could signal her type with some debt leveI D H > D NT . In that case, the higher debt would be risky for the high-type manager and financiaI distress would not 18Technically, financiai distress is out of the equilibrium path. Hence, beliefs that give a probability 1 for the incumbent's being a low-type manager are consistent with a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Note also that, as in most games of incomplete information, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs must be assigned because, in principie, shareholders could think that the incumbent is a high-type manager who, contrary to the equilibrium strategies, did not reorganize the firmo 19In the separating equilibrium, the high-type manager is indifferent between the debt leveis D H and D NT . The indifference breaks down, though, if the high type's salary increases with the firm's market value. (For instance, if the manager's compensation scheme includes stock options.) In this case, the high type is strictly better off with the higher debt that positively updates the market's perception about the firm's value.
200ne can easily check from equation (1) that D NT will be risky for the high type if
14 detect a low-type manager who mimicked the high type. Given the updating when the debt is chosen, neither the raider nor the shareholders would have a reason to replace the incumbent.
As a result, the low-type manager can insulate herself from the threats of both takeover and financiai distress by deviating to the higher debt, breaking down the separating equilibrium.
A separating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys good news about the incumbent manager thusdoes not exist if takeover costs are small enough to make the debt D NT that deters the raider risky for the high-type manager. In fact, Proposition 2, below, shows that semiseparating and mixed-strategy equilibria in which high leverage conveys good news about the incumbent manager can be ruled out as well.
Proposition 2 lf takeover costs are small enough to make the debt DNT From Proposition 2, managers should not expect a positive updating about their skills if takeover costs are small and leverage is increased sharply to end a takeover threat. As the next section shows, a negative updating may actually result, increasing the chances of managerial turnover in spite of the commitment to enhance value.
The semiseparating equilibrium
In this paper, both types of manager must increase leverage to avoid a takeover. How much leverage should be increased, however, may depend on the manager's type. A modest increase that commits the firm to the reorganization plan should be enough to deter a raider who, after due diligence, learns that the incumbent manager is likely to be a high type. Accordingly, the high-type manager may respond to the takeover threat with a small increase in leverage.
In contrast, the low-type manager knows that due diligence will inform the raider about her suboptimal skills, enhancing the incentives for a takeover. Rather than mimicking the hightype manager, the low type may then prefer to choose a higher debt levei that leaves no room for a takeover. If so, high leverage will convey bad news about the incumbent because it refiects stronger pressure on the low-type manager to increase leverage.
A semiseparating equilibrium can capture the link between the signaling role of debt and the pressure to lever up. In this equilibrium, the low-type manager is indifferent between a debt levei that ends the takeover threat and the high type's lower debt choice. Hence she is willing to randomize between these two debt leveis. Since the lower debt may be chosen by both types of manager, the takeover threat remains alive. In particular, the raider will take over if he receives the signal ro that negatively updates his beliefs about the incumbent manager.
Still, only the low-type manager fears takeovers enough to accept the distress threat required to deter the raider. The goal of this section is to characterize this equilibrium, unveiling the restrictions it imposes on the debt strategies.
Consider first the larger debt DL. Since the high-type manager chooses the lower debt D H with probability 1, DL reveals the incumbent as a low-type manager. Hence either DL ends the takeover threat or the raider takes over the firm with probability 1. Accordingly, a low-type manager will choose DL only if it deters the raider. In particular, it must end the takeover threat with the smallest possible probability of financiai distress. As shown in section 2, this last condition implies that the larger debt is equal to D
which takes into account that the financial-distress threat provides the incentives for the lowtype manager to reorganize the firmo By choosing the larger debt, the low-type manager enters financiai distress if and only if
NT , which implies that the probability that the manager will be ousted in financiaI distress is a NT . In turn, DNT ends the takeover threat. The reorganization. Since the motivation for an increase in leverage in this paper is the commitment to reorganize, the focus is on equilibria in which financiaI distress triggers managerial turnover.
In other words, I Iook for parameter vaIues that support an equilibrium in which financiaI distress under D H triggers managerial turnover.
If managerial turnover in financiaI distress were the only concern of the Iow-type manager, she would be strictIy better off with the Iower debt D H . In the proposed equiIibrium, however, D H allows for the takeover to happen given the signal TO. Hence, choosing D H entails benefits and costs. On the one hand, i t reduces the risk of managerial turnover in financiaI distress.
On the other hand, it increases the risk of a disciplinary takeover.
The strength of the takeover threat is an important deterrninant of this tradeoff. In particular, the incentives for the Iow-type manager to rnimic the high type should be Iarge if she thinks D H will impose a weak takeover threat. Nonetheless, that is not likeIy to be the case.
If the signal r is informative about the manager's quality, the Iow-type manager knows that the raider is likeIy to Iearn that she is not the best person to run the firmo Indeed, Bayes' ruIe impIies that, from the point of view of a Iow-type manager, the probability that the raider will receive the negative signal about her skills, r = 1'0, is po > l21 Hence from the viewpoint of the Iow-type manager, the probability that a takeover will not happen under DH is 1-po < ~, impIying that the probability that she will survive both the takeover and the distress threats In computing D H and DL, the above analysis assumed that the high-type manager chooses D H with probability 1. A necessary condition for the semiseparating equilibrium to exist, therefore, is that D NT is risky for a high-type manager who is committed to reorganize the company. If DNT were safe, the larger debt would insulate her from both the takeover and the distress threat, which would make her deviate from the debt D H that keeps the takeover threat alive. The semiseparating equilibrium will then exist only if
In other words, the semiseparating equilibrium requires the takeover costs not to be too large.
Of course, DNT being risky is not a suflicient condition for the high-type manager to choose the lower debt with probability 1. The high type should weigh the costs and benefits of the larger debt, that is, DNT raises the probability of managerial turnover in financial distress but ends the takeover threat. For the low-type manager, these costs and benefits cancel each other. For a more efficient manager, levering up to D NT implies a lower probability of financiaI distress. How then can it be that the high-type manager is unwilling to substitute the distress threat for the takeover threat when the less efficient low-type manager is willing to do s07 23
If the signal r is informative about the manager's quality, the high-type manager knows that the raider is likely to learn that she is the best person to run the firmo In other words, contrary to the low type, the high-type manager thinks that the signal ro that increases the which decreases the incentives to deviate. The high-type manager will lose this gain if the firm is taken over, however. In contrast, the gains from a decrease in the distress threat under D NT cannot be destroyed, because the larger debt levei deters the raider. Hence the greater efficiency of the high-type manager imposes an unambiguous bias toward the higher debt leveI.
incentives for a takeover is unlikely to realize. lndeed, a straight application of Bayes' rule implies that prob( r = ro I s = S H) = PI < ~. 24 Therefore, takeovers do not put as much pressure on high-type managers to lever up as on low ones. The lower debt D H can thus be optimal for the high type despite keeping the takeover threat alive.
Yet the greater optimism of the high-type manager may not prevent her from deviating to the higher debt leveI. If D H imposes a high risk of financiaI distress, the low-type manager may prefer to increase it a little more to end the takeover threat. The lower debt leveI thus cannot be too large. As Proposition 3 shows, this restriction in the endogenous debt DH can be mapped into a restriction in the exogenous takeover cost.
Proposition 3 In a semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the incumbent manager, both the larger debt D NT that deters the raider and the lower debt D H that keeps the takeover threat alive decrease with the takeover cost.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is straightforward. A decrease in the takeover cost makes it harder for a low-type manager to deter the raider, forcing her to increase the probability of managerial turnover in financiaI distress. Since the larger debt becomes less attractive to the low-type manager, the lower debt must also impose a higher probability of managerial turnover in financiaI distress or else the low-type manager will no longer be indifferent between the two debt levels, as required by the semiseparating equilibrium. Smaller takeover costs thus increase both D H and D NT . 25 It then follows that takeover costs cannot be too small or else the high-type manager will want to deviate to the debt D NT that deters the raider. Since it has already been argued that the semiseparating equilibrium requires that the takeover costs not be too large, high leverage conveys bad news about the manager only if takeover costs are neither too large nor too small. • Shareholders' strategy: Dismiss the incumbent manager in financial distress.
• Beliefs:
where p is the prior on the incumbent's being a low-type manager and 'Y is the probability that the low type chooses D H .
Proposition 4 characterizes the semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the manager's quality. In the equilibrium, the high-type manager levers up to a debt leveI that keeps the takeover threat alive but, once the fum is reorganized, does not impose a distress threat. In contrast, the low-type manager, who fears takeovers the most, is willing to substitute a distress threat for the takeover threat. When choosing the larger debt, the low type manager commits to enhance the fum's value but increases the chances of being replaced by her own shareholders. Consider first the random debt strategies of the low-type manager. Since D NT = 1.7248
is risky for the low-type manager, the shareholders' strategy of firing the incumbent in financiaI distress will induce her to reorganize the assets. Thus, the firm will beco me financially The low-type manager is willing to randomize between the two debt leveIs, as required by the semiseparating equilibrium.
Let us now move to the high-type manager. Since DH > O, it commits the high-type manager to reorganize the firm, after which the debt is riskless for her. Nonetheless, DH will not block the takeover if the raider receives the signal ro. From the perspective of a high-type manager, the probability of losing the job after choosing D H is then equal to the probability that r = ro conditioned on the incumbent's being a high-type one. By Bayes' rule, this conditional probability is PI = 0.3. Therefore, takeovers put less pressure on high-type managers to lever up than on low ones. The expected utility of the high-type manager under
By deviating to DNT = 1.7428, the high-type manager substitutes a distress threat for the takeover threat. Since financiai distress triggers managerial turnover, it would be optimal for the high-type manager to reorganize the firm after choosing DNT. Therefore, financiai distress happens if and only if D NT > S H + (} =} (} < 1.7428 -S H = 0.3428. The expected utility of the
The high-type manager is then strictly better off with her equilibrium strategy.
It remains to show that D H keeps the takeover threat alive and that it optimally implies managerial turnover in financiai distress. By Bayes' mie, l(PQ, "() == 'Ypo+no-po) = 0.677 is the probability that the incumbent manager is a low-type one given that i) D H has been chosen, ii) the signal ro updates diffuse priors on the incumbent's type to po = 0.7, iii) the high-type manager chooses DH with probability 1, and iv) the low-type manager randomizes between D H and DL with probabilities "( = . 9 and 1-"( = .1, respectively. As a result, the value added by a takeover given DH = 1.0826 and the signal ro is
The term in brackets in equation (2) is the expected increase in the continuation value of an all-equity firm whose incumbent manager -who is a low-type one with probability l(po, "() -is replaced by a new one with expected type s. The negative term in the equation captures the effects of leverage on the value added by a takeover. Given the equilibrium strategies and beliefs, financiai distress under DH = 1.0826 happens when the incumbent is a low-type manager and (} < .0826. The value added by a takeover is then reduced because the lowtype incumbent would have been disInissed in the distress states with or without the raider.
Equation (2) shows that the value added by a takeover is larger than the takeover cost. As required by the semiseparating equilibrium, D H keeps alive the takeover threat.
Finally, given the equilibrium strategies, D NT reveals the incumbent as a low-type manager and D H cannot lead the high-type manager into financiaI distress. Hence financial distress and Bayesian updating will let the shareholders know that the incumbent is a low-type manager and managerial turnover will follow. Moreover, for any other debt leveI, managerial turnover in financiaI distress will be optimal if out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen so that prob( s = sLID) = 1 for D ti-{D H , DL}. It has then been shown that i) it is optimal for the high-type manager to choose DH, ü) it is optimal for the low-type manager to randomize between DH and D NT with probabilities .9 and .1, respectively, iii) it is optimal for the shareholders to fire the incumbent in financiaI distress, iv) DH does not end the takeover threat, and v) it is optimal for both types of manager to reorganize the firm after the increase in leverage. A semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the manager thus follows.
Takeover costs and equilibrium selection
As demonstrated in Proposition 4, the semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the manager breaks down if the debt DNT that deters the raider is safe for the high-type manager. Intuitively, if D NT were safe for the high type, she would be strictly better off deviating to the higher debt leveI, which would end the takeover threat without imposing a distress threat. But then the larger debt could not possibly send a bad signal about the incumbent manager.
As it turns out, Proposition 1 in section 2 shows that a separating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys good news exists when DNT is safe for the high-type manager, which is likely to be the case when takeover costs are high. In times when takeover costs are high, therefore, the model predicts that a large increase in leverage will convey good news about the manager. As I discuss in section 4, this prediction leads to implications for the stock price reaction to debt-for-equity exchanges that can be used to test the relevance of the signaling role of debt under a takeover threat.
Large takeover costs are not the only reason for breaking down the equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the manager, though. The equilibrium does not survive 23 small takeover costs either. The intuition is the following. As the takeover costs decrease, the probability of managerial turnover in financial distress must be increased for V NT to block the takeover. From Proposition 3, the lower debt D H must increase as well. The increase in D H challenges the semiseparating equilibrium in two ways. First, the lower debt DH may impose a threat of financial distress on the high-type manager, who will then feel too tempted to deviate to the debt D NT that ends the takeover threat. Second, D H may end up being large enough to deter the raider, which obviously breaks down the semiseparating equilibrium because the lowtype manager now has no incentives to lever up to DNT. For the semi-separating equilibrium to exist, therefore, the takeover costs cannot be too small.
More interestingly, as the takeover cost decreases, it is more likely that the low-type manager will mimic the high-type. More precisely, the probability ' Y that the low-type manager will choose D H must be above a cutoff l' that increases when the takeover costs decrease. A pooling equilibrium in which both types of manager commit to reorganize the firm by choosing the same debt levei then arises as a natural outcome of the capital structure problem when takeover costs become sufficiently small. Formally, Proposition 5 suggests that as takeover costs decrease, debt will be used as an entrenchment device less often. Intuitively, debt can block a strong takeover threat only if it implies a high probability of managerial turnover in financial distress. Substituting turnover in a very likely distress event for a takeover is not a substantial improvement for low-type managers, though.
As a result, the latter may prefer to pool with the high-quality managers at lower debt in an attempt to mislead the raider while reducing the probability of losing their jobs in financiai distress. The mo dei thus predicts a relatively low dispersion of intraindustry leverage in periods of low takeover costs.
4 Discussion and Implications 4.1 Stock price reaction to debt-for-equity exchanges
In this paper, leverage serves two purposes. On the one hand, it substitutes a distress threat for a takeover threat, committing the firm to an increase in value. On the other hand, it sends a signal of the incumbent manager's ability to enhance value. Although the commitment role of debt implies that high leverage conveys good news to shareholders, high leverage sends a bad signal of the incumbent manager's ability if takeover costs are small. In other words, the model predicts that the signaling role of debt depends on the takeover costs. As largue below, the stock price reaction to a debt-for-equity exchange provides a test of this prediction. 26
In the model, a takeover threat is the only reason for a manager to introduce debt into the capital structure. In reality, a manager who is insulated from the takeover market is unlikely to remain with an all-equity capital structure. Hart and Moore (1995) , for instance, argue that empire-building motives induce managers to borrow to finance new projects. Likewise, tax benefits of debt might induce managers with stock options in their compensation plans to accept some risk of financiaI distress.
Consider then a decrease in takeover costs that leads to the semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the incumbent manager. This decrease in takeover costs will not induce an increase in leverage in firms run by high-type managers who, for tax reasons or empire-building motives, may have previously levered up their fums to debt leveIs higher than or equal to the lower debt D H of Proposition 4. The decrease in the takeover costs is more likely to increase leverage in firms run by low-type managers who choose to lever up to the higher debt D NT that deters the raider. Accordingly, the stock price reaction to a debt-for-equity exchange should mostly reflect a low-type manager's leverage decision when small takeover costs imply the semiseparating equilibrium in which high leverage conveys bad news about the incumbent manager.
In contrast, there is no reason to believe that a debt-for-equity exchange will mostly reflect a low-type manager's leverage decision in periods of large takeover costs. As section 2 demonstrated, low-type managers choose lower debt leveIs in such times. An increase in the takeover 26See Comett and Travlos (1989) and Masulis (1980) and (1983) for some empirical papers that document the stock price reaction to a debt-for-equity exchange in the V.S.
threat that induces a low-type manager to lever up will also increase the minimum debt leveI that allows a high-type manager to signal her superior skills. Hence the average stock price reaction to debt-for-equity exchanges should be stronger in periods of large takeover costs than in periods of small takeover costs. Garvey and Hanka (1999) find evidence that the adoption of antitakeover laws increases takeover costs., leading to changes in corporate leverage. As such, the model's predictions can be tested by comparing stock price reactions to debt-for-equity exchanges in fums incorporated in different states. Assuming that the proportion of low-type managers is the same across states, the model predicts a stronger stock price reaction in fums incorporated in states that adopt antitakeover laws.
Leverage and managerial turnover
In the model, shareholders act on their beliefs only if the fum becomes financially distressed.
In reality, financiaI distress is not the only corporate event that makes managers more vulnerabIe to shareholders' assessment of their skills. The presence of a new large shareholder, for instance, may trigger the same type of control fight that is implicitly assumed to happen in financiaI distress. By causing a negative updating about the incumbent manager's abilities, an increase in leverage enhances the chances of a future control fight both in and outside financiaI distress. 27 In deciding whether to use debt as an entrenchment device, managers then face a tradeoff between an ongoing takeover threat and the risk of being ousted Iater on by their shareholders.
This tradeoff is the essence of the semiseparating equilibrium of section 3, which yields the following implications for the leverage and managerial turnover decisions: i) managers who lever up the most are more likely to be replaced by their shareholders, ii) corporate Ieverage decreases with takeover costs, and iii) intraindustry leverage is less dispersed in periods when 27 Allowing the shareholders to replace the incumbent management outside financiai distress reduces the takeover gains. Nonetheless, this reduction will not entirely eliminate the takeover gains if the raider has private information about the incumbent manager's skills. Managers' incentives to use debt as a takeover defense, therefore, are still present. In this setting, the semiseparating equilibrium of section 3 obtains: A high-type manager chooses a debt levei that does not block the takeover while a low type randomizes between the high type's choice and a higher levei that blocks the takeover. Unlike in section 3, though, the low-type manager is now indifferent between a debt levei that allows for a takeover with a positive probability and a higher debt levei that implies a positive probability that her shareholders will trigger managerial turnover in and outside financiai distress. takeover costs are small.
The first implication, which follows naturally from high leverage conveying a negative signal of the manager's quality, is consistent with the findings in Safieddine and Titman (1999) . In a sample of 573 firms that defeat a takeover bid, Safieddine and Titman document an average turnover rate of 36.8% for the firms that increase leverage the most and a 30% turnover rate for those that. increase leverage the least. 28 1\rrning to the second implication, Proposition 3 shows that both equilibrium debt leveis decrease with the takeover cost. Accordingly, Garvey and Hanka (1999) find that, on average, leverage decreases for a sample of firms incorporated in states that adopt antitakeover laws, which -the authors argue -increase takeover costs.
Finally, Proposition 5 shows that, in response to smaller takeover costs, low-type managers are more likely to pool with high-type managers. Instead of levering up and facing a large risk of financiai distress (remember that the debt D NT that deters the raider decreases with takeover costs), inefficient managers may pool with the efficient ones at lower debt in an attempt to mislead not only the raider but also the shareholders. Intraindustry leverage, thus, should be less dispersed in periods when takeover costs are small.
I am not aware of any empirical study that has looked at the relation between intraindustry leverage and takeover costs. The experiment design of Garvey and Hanka can be used to test this implication, though. The model predicts that, in a sample of firms incorporated in states that adopt antitakeover laws, there should be more dispersion of intraindustry leverage after antitakeover laws are adopted.
Conclusions
Recent empirical research provides evidence that, under a takeover threat, managers lever up to commit to an increase in firm value that makes a disciplinary takeover unnecessary.
In particular, Safieddine and Titman (1999) document an increase in operating performance for the firms in their sample that increase leverage the most in response to a takeover bid.
Despite the increase in performance, these firms experience a high rate of managerial turnover.
Apparently, it is not enough for managers under a takeover threat cormnit to reorganize the firmo They must also prove to their shareholders that they are the best people to turn the firm around.
This paper shows that an increase in leverage that ends a takeover threat may commit the incumbent manager to enhance value and yet convey a bad signal of her ability to turn the firm around. The negative updating cannot be taken as given, though. If takeover costs are large, high leverage conveys a positive signal about the incumbent manager's skills, as in the standard signaling literature on capital structure choice. Shareholders and boards of directors must infer the incumbent manager's quality from the size of the leverage increase and the size of the takeover costs; a task that is by no means simple.
Empirical research is thus needed to determine whether an increase in leverage under a takeover threat conveys a relevant signal of management 's quality. The model's implications for the frequency of managerial turnover, the strength of the stock price reaction to debtfor-equity exchanges, and the dispersion and leveI of intraindustry leverage provide a starting point for future empirical work.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Since the shareholders' strategy implies that financial distress triggers managerial turnover, it is optimal for both types of manager to implement the value-enhancing reorganization plan for any debt choice D > O. In fact, DH ~ S H implies that the high-type manager can end the distress threat by reorganizing the firmo Moreover, because D H reveals the incumbent as a high-type manager, the commitment to reorganize also ends the takeover threat. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies assure that the high-type manager stays in control, giving her no reason to deviate.
Likewise, it is not in the interest of the low-type manager to deviate from her equilibrium strategy. Any debt leveI D > DNT increases the risk of managerial turnover in financiaI distress. In turn, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs assign a probability 1 for the incumbent's being a low-type manager for any D < D NT . Since D NT is the minimum debt that deters a raider who knows the incumbent is a low-type manager, D < DNT and the out-of-equilibrium beliefs imply that a takeover will surely happen. Finally, the shareholders' strategy of fuing the incumbent manager in financiaI distress is optimal because D NT reveals the incumbent as a low type and the out-of-equilibrium beliefs assign probability 1 to the incumbent's being a low-type manager if D H leads the firm into financiaI distress or any D 1:: {DH, DNT} is chosen. The strategies and beliefs, therefore, form a separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Separating equilibria o Consider fust a separating equilibrium in which both types of manager reorganize the fum at t = 0, the high type chooses DH, and the low type chooses DL < D H . In the proposed equilibrium, D H ends the takeover threat. Therefore, DL can be optimal for the low-type manager only if it also ends the takeover threat. In particular, it must be equal to the debt D NT that deters a raider who knows the incumbent is a low-type manager with the minimum probability of managerial turnover in financial distress. To see what type of restriction this condition imposes, let p = prob(s = sLIDL, ro) > ~ be the probability that S = SL when DL is observed and the raider receives the signal ro that negatively updates his beliefs about the incumbent's skills. Then DL deters the raider only if
The first term in equation (3) is the expected gain of a takeover conditioned on the incumbent's being a low-type one, the realization of the signal ro, and the choice of DL = sL + a. The second term shows that the takeover may be a mistake. With probability 1 -p, the raider wili mistakenly replace a high-type manager. Since DL must be safe for the high-type manager, DL :S sH =} (} :S SH -SL. The equilibrium then breaks down if
Mixed-strategy equilibria
In this type of equilibrium, the high-type manager randomizes between a high debt leveI, 
Now, {3 is determined by the incentive compatibility conditions of the debt strategies of the two types ofmanager, which are independent ofthe takeover cost C. For given v > ~,SH, SL, and s, the takeover gain will outweigh the takeover cost C if the iatter is small enough. In this case, D H will not end the takeover threat, breaking down the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
o
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof consists of four steps. The first step assures that the strategies of the two types of manager are optimal whiie assuming that the iower debt D H does not end the takeover threat.
The second step obtains the restrictions that allow D H to keep the takeover threat alive and show that they are consistent with the restrictions from the incentive compatibility conditions. The third step shows that the sharehoiders' strategy offiring the incumbent in financiai distress is optimai given Bayesian updating and the out-of-equiiibrium beiiefs. Finally, the fourth step shows that the semiseparating equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion.
Step 1: Optimality of the debt strategies. Step 2: D H does not end the takeover threat
Let lb,po) be the updating of the probability that the incumbent is a low-type manager conditioned on DH, a prior Po, and the probabilities 1 and r that the high type and the low- The first term in equation (6) is the expected gain of a takeover conditioned on the incumbent's being a low-type one, which is an event with probability lb,po). The raider's decision to replace the incumbent increases the firm's value only if the managerial change would not have happened in the absence of the takeover. For debt D H = S L + (3NT, managerial turnover in distress happens with probability (3NT. Therefore, given DH, the expected gain of a takeover conditioned on the incumbent's being a low-type manager is (1-(3NT)k(s -sd. The second term shows that managerial turnover may be a mistake. With probability l-l( r,PO), the incumbent is a high type and managerial turnover leads to an expected 10ss. Only the replacement loss in the nondistress states, which is an event with probability 1 -max[(3NT -(s H -S d, O], can be attributed to the takeover, though.
From equation (6), one can check that the value added by a takeover is positive only if incumbent in financiaI distress.
Step 4: Semiseparating equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion
Testing whether the equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion requires assuming that there is no takeover under a proposed deviation DV. For DV ::; SH < DNT, the Iow-type manager is strictIy better off under DV because the new debt will end the takeover threat whiIe impIying a Iower probability of financiaI distress than D NT . For D V > SH, the high-type manager will be in financiaI distress with positive probability. Hence, the intuitive criterion requires that there is no takeover and that financiaI distress does not trigger managerial turnover. 29 The Since the proof of Proposition 4 showed that V H must be safe for the high-type manager, the semiseparating equilibrium breaks down for any C < ê. o 29Differently from in the case in which D V is safe for the high-type manager, the set of types that may have led the firm to distress is now T = {SL, SH}. The intuitive criterion requires the low-type manager to be strictly better off in the equilibrium strategy than in D V for any best response of the shareholders given beliefs in T.
